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Richard Taylor’s Good and Evil first appeared in 1984; for the 2000, revised edition, Taylor has edited
some sections and added a final chapter on the meaning of life. The general theme of the book is that
moral theory in the Western tradition has generally and unfortunately been committed to a kind of moral
realism that, in Taylor’s view, treats moral problems (wrongly) as if they are intellectual puzzles to be
solved by the development of abstract principles. According to Taylor, this way of thinking about
morality blinds us to the fact that morality arises in our interactions with other beings who, like
ourselves, have feelings and needs, and who can rejoice or suffer; that is, it blinds us to the fact that
moral problems are essentially human problems. Taylor argues for a sort of social contract theory of
ethics informed by the tradition of virtue ethics. Besides a discussion of the ground of ethical theory,
Good and Evil has chapters devoted to the value of love, casuistry, and legal casuistry.
Taylor’s general argument is that moral philosophy has traditionally misunderstood the relationship
between Reason on the one hand and Will (desire) on the other. Most moral philosophers in the
West have assumed what Taylor calls Moral Rationalism. The Moral Rationalist thinks that Good
and Evil are objective, in the sense that those things that are good and those which are evil are so
independently of anyone’s thinking them to be so. It is the function of Reason to discern the nature
of the good and to direct the Will to pursue it (and conversely, to discern what is evil and avoid it);
hence the name ‘Moral Rationalism’. So on this view, humans are ‘rational all the way down’,
insofar as the very basis for our actions –our conception of Good and Evil – is itself rationally
intuited.
If values are objective, it follows that moral values are objective. So, according to the Moral
Rationalist, moral principles are objective features of the world and hold independently of anyone’s
accepting or acting upon them. Taylor calls any moral theory that takes moral values to be objective
features of the world True Moralities. Save for Hobbes, Nietzsche perhaps, and Socrates’ foil
Thrasymachus, most ethicists have embraced True Morality. The first part of Good and Evil is
devoted to explicating and, ultimately, rejecting Socratic, hedonistic, and Kantian ethics, all of
which are, in one way or another, True Moralities.
Taylor’s rejection of Kant’s ethical system is instructive: Taylor says that Kant’s moral theory is the
logical conclusion of the notion of True Morality, insofar as Kant held that actions are moral to the
extent that they conform to rules or principles that have universal validity, regardless of how doing
so impacts actual human lives:
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It is Reason that counts [for Kant]. It is not the living and suffering human beings who
manage sometimes to be reasonable but most of the time are not. It is not our needs and
wants, or any human desires, or any practical human goods. To act immorally is to act
contrary to Reason: it is to commit a sort of metaphysical blunder in the relationship
between one’s behavior and some generalized motive. Human needs and feelings have so
little to do with this that they are not even allowed into the picture. It someone reaches
forth to help the sick, the troubled, or the dying, this must not be done from any motive
of compassion or sentiment of love…(152)
Kantian ethics counts human beings as important only to the extent that they are rational subjects,
as he envisions when he describes the Kingdom of Ends. This is to deny an important fact about
human nature: that we have emotional and affective attachments to others, and that it is these
relationships that make our lives valuable. Besides, if we were purely rational subjects, ethics would
have no purpose, since nothing, as Taylor argues, would be good or evil in a world of purely
rational subjects. In short, it is difficult to see what the point of morality is on Kant’s view. It is not
clear why, if morality is objective in the way that the Rationalist conceives it, anyone should care
about behaving morally, since being moral may, in fact, have disastrous consequences for ourselves
and others. In short, Kant seems more interested in following rules than in relating to other persons
in ways that take into account their needs and desires.
So Taylor rejects Moral Rationalism in favor of Moral Voluntarism. The Moral Voluntarist denies
that values are objective in the sense just described. If we imagine a world devoid of beings with
any desires whatsoever, then we are imagining a world without good or evil:
...now let us note that the basic distinction between Good and Evil could not even
theoretically be drawn in a world that we imagined to be devoid of all life. That is, if we
suppose the world to be exactly as it is, except that it contains not one living thing, it
seems clear that nothing would be good and nothing bad. It would just be a dead world,
turning through space with a lifeless atmosphere. Having deprived our imagined world of
all life, we can modify it in numberless ways, but by no such modification can we ever
produce the slightest hint of good or evil in it until we introduce at least one living being
capable of reacting in one way or another to the world as that being finds it. (164-165)
Furthermore, if we imagine a world of purely rational beings, that is, beings altogether without
desire, then we still do not have a world with value in it, according to Taylor. However, as soon as
we imagine a world that contains even a single being that has desires, we are imagining a world in
which good and evil are possible:
The mere fact that a desire exists, that something is wanted, or that something is
regarded as a goal, entails that the desire should be fulfilled or the goal achieved; that is
to say, that such satisfaction would be a good for him who wants it. It matters not in the
least what the desire is. It might be, as [William] James expressed it, a desire for
“anything under the sun”. (179)
Furthermore, for the Voluntarist, it is the Will (desire) that determines (in the metaphysical sense)
whether some thing is good or evil (by desiring it or desiring to avoid it). Having deemed it good,
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the Will then directs Reason to determine the best way to get it. Thus, whereas the Rationalist holds
that the Will is in the employ of Reason, the Voluntarist reverses this order of dependency. On the
Voluntarist picture of human nature, humans are not “rational all the way down”, because the
fundamental motivation for our actions – our needs and desires – cannot themselves be judged by
rational standards.
If values are not objective, then moral values cannot be objective, either. Taylor thus holds that
moral rules are not metaphysically grounded. Rather, moral rules arise when two or more affective
beings come into the world; only in such a world is there the possibility of conflict between desires,
and only in such a world is there the possibility of cooperation toward a common good. So for
Taylor, moral rules are not objective in the sense that they hold independently of whether anyone
believes or even considers them, as the Moral Rationalist thinks. Rather, moral rules are
conventional; Taylor ends up arguing for something like a social contract theory of ethics:
That two beings should fight and injure each other in their contest for something that
each covets, and thereby, perhaps, each lose the good he wanted to seize, is clearly an
evil to both. But in the absence of a rule of behavior – that is, some anticipated behavior
to the contrary – no wrong has been done; only an evil has been produced…The wrong
comes into being with the violation of the rule. (176)
It should be noted that by a ‘rule’, Taylor means “…nothing but practices or ways of behaving that
are more or less regular and that can, therefore, be expected.” (173). However, it is misleading to
say that morality is purely conventional:
The distinction between good and evil is not a natural one that merely awaits discovery,
neither is it purely conventional, in the sense that it is arbitrarily created by this or that
culture. Good and evil, as such, form no part of the framework of nature, as do darkness
and light, for they would find no place whatsoever in a world devoid of any living thing.
At the same time, however, they do result, in a perfectly natural way, from certain facts
of human nature that are evident to anyone, and along with them emerges every other
moral distinction…(191)
So what are we left with once we reject the idea that there is a True or Natural morality, and claim
that moral principles are only conventional? And what does morality amount to if it isn’t a matter
of acting on the correct moral principles? Taylor thinks that Kant was correct in identifying the
motive for one’s actions as the essential element in determining whether they are good or evil. But
Kant was wrong to think that the motive for good actions was the motive of duty, which simply
amounts to allegiance to abstract rules. According to Taylor, there are four basic kinds of motive:
egoism, self-hatred, malice toward others, and compassion. Behavior that is motivated by sympathy
and compassion for others, Taylor thinks, is good; behavior that is motivated by self-hatred or
malice is evil. This is so regardless of the moral principles invoked to justify the behavior in
question. Taylor makes this point by way of a series of very effective examples, in what is perhaps
the best chapter in the book, "The Virtue of Compassion". There the basic point of the book
emerges: if we want a world in which people treat each other with compassion and respect, we will
not achieve it by appealing to abstract rules that direct us to treat one another in such ways. In fact,
if some person – a psychopath, for instance, or Thrasymachus perhaps – simply refuses to care for
the interests of others, there is no principled way to say that he or she is wrong. The best we can do
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is to try our best to cultivate the virtues of compassion and respect for others in ourselves and in
those around us. This raises the problem of what to do when people’s goals and values conflict, as
they inevitably will. Although Taylor rejects classical Utilitarianism because of its commitment to
hedonism (Taylor argues that the claim that pleasure is the highest good is either false or empty), he
does think that when desires conflict, the right course is to promote those desires that are
compatible with the maximization of the most actual desires that people in general have:
A better formulation [than Mill’s] of the idea of the common good…would be this: The
maximum fulfillment of all those aims that different people actually have, and the
maximum satisfaction of their felt desires, whatever these may be, at the least cost – that
is, with the minimum frustration of precisely the same aims and desires. (182-183)
Good and Evil, then, is a book that challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of most of
Western ethics: that the task involved in debating and solving ethical problems is one that
essentially involves the use of Reason and requires somehow ‘setting aside’ our feelings toward
others and our relationships with them.
In the final chapter, on the meaning of life, Taylor draws out the implications of his view for the
case of Sisyphus, condemned to eternally push rocks up hills only to see them tumble back time
and again. Taylor’s view is, predictably, that although Sisyphus’ toils have no meaning in the sense
that they have no ultimate purpose, they would have meaning if Sisyphus were somehow made to
desire rolling rocks up hills for eternity. That is, life has no objective meaning, but we should not
despair at this fact. After all, even if there were some objective, important, meaningful purpose at
which Sisyphus’ activities were aimed, what good would it do Sisyphus unless he himself found
that ultimate purpose to be valuable? And isn’t the question of whether one’s life is valuable one
that must be answered subjectively, since it only arises in any concrete way for the subject himself
or herself?
Good and Evil is one of those philosophy books – Stroud’s The Significance of Philosophical
Skepticism comes to mind as another – that is accessible to undergraduates but addresses issues of
fundamental importance in such a way that it is a challenge to professional philosophers as well.
Taylor does an excellent job of explaining the basic philosophical principles behind such diverse
thinkers as Socrates, Callicles, Thrasymachus, Epicurus, Kant and James without distorting them
and without oversimplifying them. The prose is simple and elegant, and the arguments are
straightforward and clear; Taylor does an excellent job of getting the reader to realize the weight of
the problems at hand, and of explaining why philosophy is not simply – as many seem to think – an
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